Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000200130004-3

SECOM-D-766

20 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security for

Personnel Security and Investigations

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FROM:

Deputy Director of Security for

Community Affairs

SUBJECT:

OSD and the GAO Report on Investigations

in the Government.

- 1. As I mentioned to you last week, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) headed by Admiral Murphy and including Tom O'Brien moved to realign the follow-on action recommended in the GAO report on Investigations. OSD wrote to the Hill saying that Defense, because they did the majority of investigations, should have the follow up action rather than the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
- 2. They received the Hill's OK for this and OSD convened a meeting of "interested" agencies (State, FBI, OPM, DIS and a couple of others but not CIA) on 18 December.
- 3. For your information, discussions at that meeting centered on plans to look at the scope of investigations, costs and criteria for determining sensitive positions.
- 4. There seems to be little doubt that DIS, through Tom O'Brien, will make a major effort to capture a position as Community spokesman on investigations. This could have considerable impact on CIA and it might be well if CIA directly, rather than through informal mechanisms, took some interest. Two alternative approaches look viable:
 - a. CIA can contact O'Brien and request participatory status. While this would allow

us to have a voice in deliberations and actions, it puts us in a position of de facto support of the overall goals of DIS and recognizes their leadership.

- b. CIA can stand out and away completely, keeping informal tabs on activities. This sacrifices the opportunity for input of a CIA position during developmental exercises but does permit us to retain a position of some strength. We would have to be consulted sooner or later on any major changes in investigative scope DIS might propose and CIA (or at least the DCI) would have to be petitioned should modification of DCID 1/14 be recommended.
- 5. There is one additional factor worthy of consideration. This is the survey being conducted by the SECOM
 Study). It should show rather definitively that the current CIA investigative procedure produces maximum return. The inclusion of the polygraph makes it the strongest overall screening program in the Intelligence Community. It has one weakness. It does not address costs. While we may attempt to do a cost factoring as a next step, the OSD effort will steal the march on us. We might have to use whatever cost accounting procedures DIS comes up with. And we cannot override costs in todays environment. You recall that the entire GAO study had cost as its primary thrust. And they want to cut costs even if it means a sacrifice in quality.

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6. One thing is advisable. CIA must keep informed on what is happening in this field. I will try to keep you informed but SECOM is not a participant in the DIS effort.

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